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Abstract
We investigate a differentiated mixed duopoly in which private and public firms can choose
to strategically set prices or quantities by facing a union bargaining process. For the case
of a unionized mixed duopoly, only the public firm is able to choose a type of contract
irrespective of whether the goods are substitutes or complements in the equilibrium. Thus,
we show that social welfare under Bertrand competition is always determined by the public
firm’s dominant strategy, wherein the Bertrand competition entails higher social welfare than
the Cournot competition. Moreover, there are multiple Nash equilibria in the contract stage
of the game. Finally, our main results hold irrespective of the nature of goods, with the
exception of when a sufficiently large parameter of complements is employed, the ranking of
private firm’s profit is not reversed, which is contrast to the standard findings.
JEL: C7, D43, H44, J51, L13.
Keywords: Wage Bargaining, Union, Cournot-Bertrand Competition, Mixed Duopoly.
1 Introduction
For a pure duopoly1, Singh and Vives (1984) were the first to show that Bertrand competition
is more efficient than Cournot competition when goods are differentiated (see also Cheng (1985)
and Okuguchi (1987)). Their study determined that Cournot equilibrium profits are greater
than Bertrand equilibrium profits when goods are substitutes and vice versa when goods are
complements. Moreover, they established that when private firms play the downstream duopoly
game, the dominant strategy for private firms in a pure duopoly is to choose quantity contracts
if goods are substitutes. Dastidar (1997), Qiu (1997), Lambertini (1997), Ha¨ckner (2000), and
Amir and Jin (2001), among others, have analyzed counterexamples based on the framework
of Singh and Vives (1984) by allowing for a wider range of cost and demand asymmetries2.
These works, which deal with the choice of strategic variables for prices or quantities, suggested
important implications for the determination of market outcomes.
However, none of these papers have considered the case in which both private and public
firms choose to set prices or quantities in a unionized mixed duopoly3. Thus, the present paper
will be modeled around a noncooperative game in which the choice of strategic variables is set
in a unionized mixed duopoly. There are several studies of mixed oligopolies where a public
∗An earlier version of this paper titled “Cournot-Bertrand Competition in a Unionized Mixed Duopoly” under
MPRA Paper No. 12787.
†Graduate School of International Studies. Pusan National University, Jangjeon-dong, Geumjeong-gu, Busan
609-735, Republic of Korea. Tel: +82-51-510-2532. E-mail: choipnu@pusan.ac.kr
1In this paper, in order to distinguish the concept of mixed duopoly, we use “pure Cournot and Bertrand
competition in a duopoly,” when all firms are private firms.
2In particular, Zanchettin (2006) found that Singh and Vives’ (1984) result that firms always make larger
profits under quantity competition than under price competition fails to hold. Wang (2008) showed that while
profit ranking between price and quantity competition can be partially reversed, the traditional result of Singh
and Vives (1984) that firms always choose a quantity in a two-stage game continues to hold in the enlarged
parameter space.
3Only one exception is, to the best of the author’s knowledge, Ghosh and Mitra (2008), who compared Cournot
with Bertrand competition in a mixed duopoly where an endogenous type of contract is not provided and there
is no trade union in the mixed oligopoly. Later, we will mention several differences between their study and ours.
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firm traditionally maximizes the social welfare, while the private firms compete with the public
firm for maximizing their own profits4. In this paper, we address the issue of whether or not
the standard results of the ranking of Cournot- and Bertrand-equilibrium outcomes under a
differentiated mixed duopoly hold up where the public firm and the private firm are unionized.
More specifically, we illustrate the way in which the choice of strategic variables for setting prices
or quantities affects social welfare in a unionized mixed duopoly. The papers that are closest to
the present model of unionized mixed duopolies are authored by De Fraja (1993), Haskel and
Sanchis (1995), Haskel and Szymanski (1993), and Ishida and Matsushima (2009).
There also have been some attempts, namely, Lo´pez (2007) and Lo´pez and Naylor (2004),
to introduce union utility into a model of the choice of strategic variables for setting prices
or quantities. Lo´pez and Naylor (2004) compared pure Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in a
downstream differentiated duopoly in which wages are paid by each downstream player as per
outcome of a strategic bargain with its upstream labor-union. They showed that Singh and
Vives’(1984) result holds unless unions are powerful and place considerable weight on the wage
argument in their utility function. Since there can exist a dominant strategy for each private
firm in a pure duopoly when they choose either quantity or price contract depending on unions’
bargaining power and weight on the wage argument, Lo´pez (2007) analyzed the more general
case of a profit-maximizing upstream player that sells input to a duopoly in exchange for a
negotiated input-price5. However, recent studies in the literature have not investigated the issue
of how private and public firms play the noncooperative game of choosing strategic variables
in the context of wage bargaining in a mixed duopoly. Consequently, our paper differs from
previous works on unionized mixed oligopolies that focused on privatization without public and
private firms’ choices of strategic variables. Furthermore, this paper analyzes the robustness of
either Singh and Vives (1984) or the Lo´pez (2007) and Lo´pez and Naylor (2004) considering the
framework of the unionized mixed duopoly.
The timing of the game of the present paper is as follows. In the first stage, the private firm
and the public firm simultaneously commit to choosing a strategic variable for either the price or
the quantity (these are the two relevant types of contract) that is to be set in the unionized mixed
duopoly. In the second stage, each union independently bargains over its wages, keeping in mind
each strategic variable of the private and public firms. In the third stage, each firm chooses its
quantity or price simultaneously with the other firms in order to maximize its objective given
its knowledge of the strategic variable of the public and private firms and of the wage levels in
previous stages.
Given this three-stage game model, we demonstrate that the public firm will always opt for a
Bertrand type of contract and the private firm will choose either a Bertrand or a Cournot type of
contract, regardless of whether the goods are substitutes or complements in the first stage. This
4See De Fraja and Delbono (1990) and Nett (1993) for general reviews of mixed oligopoly models. For recent
literature on mixed oligopolies, see Barcena-Ruiz (2007), Matsumura (1998), Matsumura and Kanda (2005),
Matsumura and Matsushima (2004, 2006), Lu and Poddar (2006), etc.
5On the other hand, Manasakis and Vlassis (2006) extended Singh and Vives’ (1984) framework by assuming
no ex-ante commitment over the type of contract that each firm will offer consumers. In the context of a unionized
symmetric duopoly, they argued that the mode of competition in which equilibrium emerges is the one that entails
the most beneficial outcome for both the firm and its labor union, given the choice of the rival firm/union pair.
In addition, motivated by the institutional diversity of unionization structures and the growth of foreign direct
investment (FDI), the current bargaining process between firms and unions has been developed independently.
As identified by Naylor (1998, 1999), Zhao (1995), Skaksen and Sørensen (2001), Haucap and Wey (2004), and
Leahy and Montagna (2000), the amount of domestic production is decided through union bargaining when
a firm undertakes FDI. In another related paper, the relationship between the amount of production and the
union has been explored among domestic private firms (Naylor, 2002). Many studies have considered a unionized
international oligopoly; see for instance, Straume (2003), Ishida and Matsushima (2008), Mukherjee and Suetrong
(2007), and the references therein.
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is because only the public firm is able to choose the type of contract irrespective of whether the
goods are substitutes or complements. This effect allows the public firm to employ a strategic
commitment with respect to the contract choice (i.e., Bertrand competition), thereby improving
social welfare when all firms choose different types of contracts. This result, when the choice
of strategic variables is set in a unionized mixed duopoly, differs from the standard findings of
Singh and Vives (1984), Lo´pez (2007), and Lo´pez and Naylor (2004). However, as Singh and
Vives (1984) demonstrated, the outputs as well as social welfare of both public and private
firms under the Bertrand competition are higher than those under the Cournot competition.
In addition, the main results of this study hold irrespective of the nature of goods, with the
exception of when a sufficiently large parameter of complements is employed. In this case, the
ranking of a private firm’s profit is not reversed, which is contrast to the standard findings of
Singh and Vives (1984), Lo´pez (2007), and Lo´pez and Naylor (2004). This is because of the
dominant strategy in which only the public firm will choose the Bertrand contract, regardless
of the nature of the goods; it should be noted that there is no dominant strategy for the private
firm.
The main result in the present paper contrasts with Singh and Vives’ (1984) conclusion in
which a dominant strategy for the private firms in a pure duopoly is to choose the quantity
contract if goods are substitutes and vice versa. This occurs because we endogenously treat the
type of contract as it exists in a unionized mixed duopoly. That is, since the cost of production is
endogenously determined by the introduction of trade unions, it is necessary to incorporate the
role of unions to derive these results in the case of a mixed duopoly: Due to the imposition of the
budget constraint on the public firm, the public and private firms’ profits and unions’ utilities
cancel each other in the social welfare function. Hence, the public firm’s objective function is
endogenously determined by a representative consumer’s utility.
To the best of the author’s knowledge, only one study has attempted to compare Bertrand
and Cournot outcomes in a mixed oligopoly when the goods are substitutes: Ghosh and Mitra
(2008). More specifically, Ghosh and Mitra (2008) derived their results by comparing Cournot
and Bertrand competition in a mixed oligopoly wherein the endogenous type of contract is
not determined by the public firm and there is no trade union. Hence, Ghosh and Mitra
(2008) ) demonstrated that the rankings of the profit and social welfare of firms is exogenously
determined. The theoretical results of the present study, however, consider the problem in a
differentiated mixed duopoly in which both private and public firms can choose to strategically
set prices or quantities by facing a union bargaining process. Therefore, this paper differs from
the existing literature in at least two important aspects. First, the existing studies on mixed
oligopolies consider an exogenous type of contract rather than an endogenous one. Second,
while previous works have focused on reverse results with regard to the Cournot-Bertrand profit
differential in a pure oligopoly market, this paper not only investigates a case in which both
private and public firms choose to set prices or quantities regardless of the nature of goods but
also determines how social welfare is affected by the type of contract structure.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model. Sec-
tion 3 presents fixed-timing games regarding the type of contract. Section 4 determines firms’
endogenous choices of strategic variables. Concluding remarks appear in Section 5.
2 The Basic Model
The basic structure is a differentiated duopoly model, which is a simplified version of Singh and
Vives’ model (1984). Consider two single-product firms that produce differentiated products
that are supplied by a public firm (firm 0) and a private firm (firm 1). We assume that the
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representative consumer’s utility is a quadratic function given by
U = xi + xj − 12
(
x2i + 2cxixj + x
2
i
)
,
where xi denotes the output of firm i (i = 0, 1). The parameter c ∈ (0, 1) is a measure of
the degree of substitutability among goods, while a negative c ∈ (−1, 0) implies that goods are
complements. In the main body of analysis we focus on the imperfect substitutability case of
c ∈ (0, 1). However, we will mention later imperfect complementarity case of c ∈ (−1, 0) since
it is easy to calculate when goods are complements6. Thus, the inverse demand is characterized
by
pi = 1− cxj − xi; i 6= j, i = j = 0, 1, (1)
where pi is firm i’s market price and xi denotes the output of firm i(i = 0, 1). Hence, we can
obtain the direct demands as
xi =
(1− c) + cpj − pi
1− c2 (2)
provided the quantities are positive.
To analyze the union’s wage bargaining, we also assume that the public and private firms
are unionized and that the wages, wi are determined as a consequence of bargaining between
firms and unions. Let w denote the reservation wage. Thus, we assume that the union sets the
wage while public and private firms unilaterally decide the level of employment. Taking w as
given, the union’s optimal wage-setting strategy, wi, regarding firm i is defined as:
ui = (wi − w)θxi; i = 0, 1, (3)
where θ is the weight that the union attaches to the wage level. As suggested by Haucap and Wey
(2004), Leahy and Montagna (2000), and Lommerud et al. (2003)), for simplicity of exposition,
we assume that the union possesses full bargaining power (i.e., θ = 1) for the wage level and
w = 0 to show our results in the simple way7.
The firms are homogeneous with respect to productivity. Each firm adopts a constant
returns-to-scale technology where one unit of labor is turned into one unit of the final good.
The price of labor (i.e., wage) that firm i has to pay is denoted by wi, i = 0, 1.
To specify the public firm 0’s objective function SW , and each firm’s profit pii, as
SW = U −
1∑
i=0
pxi +
1∑
i=0
(pii + ui),
pii = (pi − wi)xi, i = 0, 1,
where U −∑1i=0 pxi is the consumer surplus, and each firm pii is the profit of both the private
and public firm, and ui is the union’s utility for both the private and public firm. The objective
function of the public firm is the sum of consumer surplus, profit of all firms and the union’s
utility for all the firms.
6The detailed computations of complements are available from author upon request; The Appendix C will not
be included in the main paper since the inference can be easily verified by reversing signs of c. Furthermore, we
exclude independent case since the choice of strategic variables for setting prices or quantities does not change
social welfare in a unionized mixed duopoly.
7As Naylor (1998, 1999), Haucap and Wey (2004), Leahy and Montagna (2000), and Lommerud et al. (2003)
suggested, this is because wage claims are decided by the elasticity of labor demand rather than the firm’s profit.
See also Oswald and Turnbull (1985).
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This study considers that each firm can make two types of binding contracts with consumers,
as described by Singh and Vives (1984) and Lo´pez (2007). Thus, a three-stage game is con-
ducted. The timing of the game is as follows. In the first stage, the private and public firms
simultaneously commit to choosing strategic variable, i.e., either price or quantity (which de-
termines the type of contract), to set in the unionized mixed duopoly. In the second stage,
each union independently bargains over its wage, wi, i = 0, 1, keeping in mind each strategic
variable of the private and public firms. In the third stage, each firm chooses its quantity or
price simultaneously, in order to maximize its objective knowledge of the strategic variable of
the public and private firms and of the wage levels in previous stages. As in Singh and Vives
(1984) and Lo´pez (2007), we adopt the same assumption. i.e., that there are prohibitively high
costs associated with changing the type of contract in the first stage.
3 Bargaining in a Mixed Duopoly
3.1 Results: Fixed Contract Motives with Solutions of Substitutes
Before the use of the type of contract for applying in the model and identifying the point of
equilibrium, four different cases of contract games are explained. In Bertrand competition, firms
set prices, whereas in Cournot competition, firms set quantities. In mixed cases, firm 0 sets the
price and firm 1 sets the quantity, and vice versa. Such game is solved by backward induction,
i.e., the solution concept used is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE).
3.1.1. [Competition Game in Cournot]: Assume that firm i(i = 0, 1) faces the inverse
demand functions given by pi = 1− cxj −xi. In the third stage, the public firm’s objective is to
maximize the social welfare which is defined as the sum of consumer surplus, each firm’s profit,
and each union’s utility:
SW = U − p0x0 − p1x1 + pi1 + u1 + pi0 + u0 = U.
Given w1 for the private firm (firm 1), the public firm’s maximization problem is as follows:
max
x0
SW = U s.t. (p0 − w0)x0 ≥ 0.
The constraint implies that there is some lower-bound restriction on the public firm’s profit, i.e.,
the public firm faces a budget constraint8. Therefore, since we assume that each firm’s output
is a positive value as in (2), we can rewritten the budget constraint as follows: (p0 − w0)x0 ≥
0⇔ 1− cx1 − x0 − w0 ≥ 0.
Denoting the multiplier of the budget constraint λcc, the Lagrangian equation can be written
as
L = x1 + x0 − (x
2
1 + x
2
0 + 2cx0x1)
2
+ λcc(1− x0 − cx1 − w0).
Given wage level w0 in the third stage, the first-order conditions are given by
∂L
∂x0
= 1− cx1 − x0 − λcc = 0 (4)
∂L
∂λcc
= 1− cx1 − x0 − w0 = 0. (5)
8If both unions aim to simultaneously maximize the wage-level and the public firm’s union does not face
the budget constraint with a simple Stone-Geary utility function ui = (wi − w)θxi, the public firm’s union can
limitlessly raise its wage because the optimal output level of the public firm is independent of the wage.
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On the other hand, the first-order condition for the private firm is given by
∂pi1
∂x1
= 0⇔ x1 = 12(1− cx0 − w1). (6)
Solving the first-order conditions (5) and (6), we obtain,
x0 =
2− c− 2w0 + cw1
2− c2 , (7)
x1 =
1− c− w1 + cw0
2− c2 , (8)
λcc = 1− cx1 − x0. (9)
To solve for Lagrangian equation, the budget constraint is momentarily binding. We check
ex-post that the omitted this constraint is binding.
In the second stage of this case, each wage is set to maximize its firm’s union utility:
ui = xiwi. To do this, the two independent maximization problems should be considered
simultaneously. Using (7) and (8), the problem for union i is defined as
max
w0
u0 = w0x0 =
w0(2− c− 2w0 + cw1)
2− c2 ,
max
w1
u1 = w1x1 =
w1(1− c− w1 + cw0)
2− c2 .
This implies the following first-order condition
w0 =
2− c+ cw1
4
, w1 =
1− c+ cw0
2
. (10)
Straightforward computation yields each an equilibrium wage, denoted as wcci is obtained by
solving (10), and substituting wcci into (7) and (8) yields the equilibrium output x
cc
i . Thus, we
have the following result which is the same results as in Ishida and Matsushima (2009).
Lemma 1 (Ishida and Matsushima, 2009): Suppose that goods are substitutes and each
firm’s union is allowed to engage in decentralized bargaining. Then, the equilibrium wage, output
and price levels are given by
wcc0 =
4− c− c2
8− c2 , w
cc
1 =
4− 2c− c2
8− c2 ;
xcc0 =
2(4− c− c2)
(2− c2)(8− c2) , x
cc
1 =
4− 2c− c2
(2− c2)(8− c2) ;
pcc0 = w
cc
0 =
4− c− c2
(8− c2) , p
cc
1 =
12− 6c− 7c2 + 2c3 + c4
(2− c2)(8− c2) .
This Lemma 1 suggests that the budget constraint is binding. That is, substituting Lemma 1
into (9) then we have
λcc =
8− 2c− 6c2 + c3 + c4
(2− c2)(8− c2) > 0
which shows that the public firm sets the output that yields zero profit in equilibrium.
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Finally, noting that SW cc = U cc and picc1 , we can compute the social welfare and private
firm’s profit, SW cc and picc1 as follows;
SW cc =
304− 144c− 256c2 + 92c3 + 67c4 − 12c5 − 6c6
2(8− c2)2(2− c2)2 , (11)
picc1 =
(4− 2c− c2)2
(8− c2)2(2− c2)2 . (12)
3.1.2. [Competition Game in Bertrand]; Consider that firm i faces the following direct
demand function
xi =
(1− c) + cpj − pi
1− c2 .
In the third stage, by maximization social welfare (respectively, profit) each firm sets its price
as a best response to any price chosen by its private firm (respectively, the public firm). The
public firm’s objective is given as in the previous case as follows:
max
p0
U =
(1− c) + cp1 − p0
1− c2 +
(1− c) + cp0 − p1
1− c2
− 1
2
{
[(1− c) + cp1 − p0]2 + [(1− c) + cp0 − p1]2 + 2c[(1− c) + cp0 − p1][(1− c) + cp1 − p0]
(1− c2)2
}
s.t.
(p0 − w0)[(1− c) + cp1 − p0]
1− c2 ≥ 0.
Similar to the budget constraint of 3.1.1. [Competition Game in Cournot], we can rewritten
the budget constraint as follows: p0 −w0 ≥ 0. Denoting the multiplier of the budget constraint
λbb and repeating the same process as in Competition Game in Cournot yields the first-order
conditions of the Lagrangian equation with respect to λbb and p0:
∂L
∂p0
= 0⇔ λbb = −(cp1 − p0)
1− c2 , (13)
∂L
∂λbb
= p0 − w0 = 0. (14)
On the other hand, the first-order condition for the private firm is given by
∂pi1
∂p1
= 0⇔ p1 = 1− c+ cp0 + w12 . (15)
By using xi and solving the these two equations (14) and (15) problems yields
x0 =
(1− c)(2 + c) + cw1 − (2− c2)w0
2(1− c2) , (16)
x1 =
1− c− w1 + cw0
2(1− c2) . (17)
In the second stage of this case, each wage is set to maximize the its own firm’s union:
ui = xiwi. In the analysis that follows, we again focus on the union’s maximization problem.
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Using (16) and (17), the problems for union i are defined as
max
w0
u0 = w0x0 =
w0[(1− c)(2 + c) + cw1 − (2− c2)w0]
2(1− c2) , (18)
max
wi
u1 = w1x1 =
w1(1− c− w1 + cw0)
2(1− c2) . (19)
The best reply functions for the public firm 0 and the private firm 1 are w0 =
(1−c)(2+c)+cw1
2(2−c2)
and w1 = 1−c+cw02 , respectively. Thus, straightforward computation yields each an equilibrium
wage, denoted as wbbi is obtained by maximizing (18) and (19), and substituting w
bb
i into (16)
and (17) yields the equilibrium output xbbi and price p
bb
i . Thus, we have the following result.
Lemma 2: Suppose that goods are substitutes and each firm’s union is allowed to engage in
decentralized bargaining. Then, the equilibrium wage, output and price levels are given by
wbb0 =
4− c− 3c2
8− 5c2 , w
bb
1 =
4− 2c− 3c2 + c3
8− 5c2 ;
xbb0 =
8− 2c− 10c2 + c3 + 3c4
2(1− c2)(8− 5c2) , x
bb
1 =
4− 2c− 3c2 + c3
2(1− c2)(8− 5c2) ;
pbb0 =
4− c− 3c2
8− 5c2 , p
bb
1 =
12− 6c− 9c2 + 3c3
2(8− 5c2) .
Substituting Lemma 2 into (13) then we have
λbb =
8− 14c+ 9c3 − 3c4
2(8− 5c2)(1− c2) > 0 if c < 0.90,
which shows that the budget constraint is binding9. Since the Lagrange multiplier is marginal
social welfare, when c ≥ 0.90, the Lagrange multiplier is negative, which means that relaxing
the constraint makes social welfare even lower.
Finally, noting that SW bb = U bb and pibb1 , we can compute the social welfare and private
firm’s profit as SW bb and pibb1 respectively;
SW bb =
304− 144c− 816c2 + 316c3 + 787c4 − 222c5 − 320c6 + 50c7 + 45c8
8[(1− c2)(8− 5c2)]2 , (20)
pibb1 =
(4− 2c− 3c2 + c3)2
4(1− c2)(8− 5c2)2 . (21)
3.1.3. [Firm 0 sets price, firm 1 sets quantity]: Let firm 0 optimally choose its price
as a best response to any quantity chosen private firm 1, and let private firm 1 optimally choose
its quantity as a best response to any price chosen public firm 0. The demand function that
each firm i faces are given by
x0 = 1− cx1 − p0 and p1 = 1− c+ cp0 − (1− c2)x1. (22)
9It can be easily checked by which the public firm’s profit is zero; pibb0 = [
4−c−3c2−(4−c−3c2)
8−5c2 ]x
bb
0 = 0× xbb0 = 0.
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In stage three, by maximization social welfare (respectively, profit) each firm sets its price as a
best response to any price chosen by its private firm (respectively, the public firm). The public
firm’s objective is given as in the previous case as follows:
max
p0
U = 1− cx1 − p0 + x1 − 12[(1− cx1 − p0)
2 + x21 + 2cx1(1− cx1 − p0)] (23)
s.t. (p0 − w0)(1− cx1 − p0) ≥ 0⇔ p0 − w0 ≥ 0.
Denoting the multiplier of the budget constraint λbc and repeating the same process as in
previous cases yields the first-order conditions of the Lagrangian equation with respect to p0
and λbc:
∂L
∂p0
= −p0 + λbc = 0, (24)
∂L
∂λbc
= p0 − w0 = 0. (25)
On the other hand, the private firm’s objective function as follows:
max
x1
pi1 = [1− c+ cp0 − (1− c2)x1 − w1]x1.
Thus, the first-order condition for the private firm is given by
∂pi1
∂x1
= 0⇔ x1 = 1− c+ cp0 − w12(1− c2) . (26)
Substituting the pair (x1, p0) into the pair (x0, p1) yields
x0 =
(1− c)(2 + c) + cw1 − (2− c2)w0
2(1− c2) , (27)
p1 =
1− c+ cw0 + w1
2
. (28)
Then, optimal wages are set to maximize union’s firm including the public union’s utility:
u = xiui. The best reply functions for the private firm 1 and the public firm 0 are as follows.
w1 =
1− c+ cw0
2
and w0 =
(1− c)(2 + c) + cw1
2(2− c2) .
Straightforward computation yields the same results as in Lemma 2 since best reply functions
are the same, i.e., (16) equals to (27) and (17) equals to (26). Thus, wbci = w
bb
i , x
bc
i = x
bb
i
and pbci = p
bb
i . Therefore, we obtain the same social welfare and the private firm’s profit, i.e.,
SW bc = SW bb and pibc1 = pi
bb
1 . Substituting equilibrium values into (24) yields
λbc = pbc0 =
4− c− 3c2
8− 5c2 > 0. (29)
Thus, we have the following result.
Proposition 1: Suppose that goods are substitutes and each firm’s union is allowed to engage
in decentralized bargaining. Then, regardless of the value of c, both the equilibrium private firm’s
profit and the social welfare in the case of [Firm 0 sets price, firm 1 sets quantity] are equal to
those in the case of [Competition Game in Bertrand].
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Proposition 1 suggests that regardless of the private firm’s strategic choice between price and
quantity, the public firm can commit to choosing the competition game in Bertrand even though
the optimal output is not satisfied when c ∈ [0.90, 1). Thus, the type of contract of the private
firm is determined by the public firm’s choice of the type of contract.
Due to the imposition of the budget constraint on the public firm, the wage level of the public
firm increases with its price and vice versa. Suppose that the wage level of the public firm is
increased (i.e., the price level of the public firm is increased). This effect makes the public firm
have an incentive to reduce its own output because of the best response function of the private
firm (i.e., Eqs. (16) and (27)). Notice that it is necessary that the private firm has to increase
its own price level –this arises because of Eq. (28). Thus, given the private firm’s wage level,
the private firm has an incentive to decrease its output level when the price of the private firm
is increased. Thus. one of two cases arises: Competition in Bertrand or [Firm 0 sets price, firm
1 sets quantity]. Hence, Proposition 1 indicates that an important role is played by the budget
constraint that is imposed on the public firm.
3.1.4. [Firm 1 sets price, firm 0 sets quantity]: Let firm 1 optimally choose its price
as a best response to any quantity chosen private firm 0, and let private firm 0 optimally choose
its quantity as a best response to any price chosen public firm 1. The demand function that
each firm i faces is given by
x1 = 1− cx0 − p1 and p0 = 1− c+ cp1 − (1− c2)x0. (30)
Thus, the public firm’s objective is given as in the previous case as follows:
max
x0
U = 1− cx0 − p1 + x0 − [(1− cx0 − p1)
2 + x20 + 2cx0(1− cx0 − p1)]
2
s.t. 1− c+ cp1 − (1− c2)x0 − w0 ≥ 0.
Denoting the multiplier of the budget constraint λcb, the Lagrangian equation can be written as
L = 1− cx0 − p1 + x0 − [(1− cx0 − p1)
2 + x20 + 2cx0(1− cx0 − p1)]
2
+ λcb[1− c+ cp1 − (1− c2)x0 − w0].
Taking wi as given, the first-order conditions are given by
∂L
∂x0
= 1− c− x0 + c2x0 − λcb(1− c2) = 0, (31)
∂L
∂λcb
= 1− c+ cp1 − (1− c2)x0 − w0 = 0. (32)
In the second stage of this case, from the profit and social welfare optimization for each firm,
we obtain the pair (p1, x0) as
p1 =
1 + w1 − cx0
2
and x0 =
1− c+ cp1 − w0
1− c2 . (33)
Substituting (p1, x0) into (32) yields
p1 =
1− c+ w1 − c2w1 + cw0
2− c2 and x0 =
2− c− 2w0 + cw1
2− c2 . (34)
In addition, substituting (34) into x1 yields
x1 =
1− c+ cw0 − w1
2− c2 . (35)
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Then, optimal wages are set to maximize union’s firm including the public union’s utility:
u = xiui. This implies the following equilibrium wages:
wcb0 =
4− c− c2
8− c2 , w
cb
1 =
4− 2c− c2
8− c2 .
Thus, each price is given by
pcb0 =
8− 2c− 6c2 + c3 + c4
(2− c2)(8− c2) , p
cb
1 =
12− 6c− 7c2 + 2c3 + c4
(2− c2)(8− c2) .
Similar to the case of 3.1.3. [Firm 0 sets price, firm 1 sets quantity], straightforward com-
putation yields the same results as in Lemma 1 since best reply functions in Lemma 1 equal to
(34) and (35). Thus, wcci = w
cb
i and x
cc
i = x
cb
i . Therefore, we obtain the same social welfare and
the private firm’s profit, i.e., SW cc = SW cb and picc1 = pi
cb
1 . Substituting equilibrium values into
(31) then we have
λcb =
8− 6c− 6c2 + 2c3 + c4
(1 + c)(2− c2)(8− c2) > 0 if c < 0.89.
which shows that the budget constraint is binding. Since the Lagrange multiplier, λcb is marginal
social welfare, when c ≥ 0.89, the Lagrange multiplier is negative, which means that relaxing
the constraint makes social welfare even lower. Thus, we have the following result.
Proposition 2: Suppose that goods are substitutes and each firm’s union is allowed to engage
in decentralized bargaining. Then, regardless of the value of c, both the equilibrium private firm’s
profit and the social welfare in the case of [Firm 1 sets price, firm 0 sets quantity] are equal to
those in the case of [Competition Game in Cournot].
Similar to Proposition 1, Proposition 2 suggests that regardless of the private firm’s strategic
choice, the public firm can commit to choosing the competition game in Cournot even though
the optimal output is not satisfied when c ∈ [0.89, 1).
Due to the imposition of the budget constraint on the public firm, the wage level of the
public firm increases with its price and vice versa. Suppose that the wage level of the public
firm is increased. This effect makes the public firm have an incentive to reduce its own output
level because of the best response function of the private firm (i.e., Eqs. (5) and (34)). This
means that it is necessary that the private firm has to increase its own price level–which is
because of Eq. (34). Thus, given the private firm’s wage level, the private firm has an incentive
to increase its output level when the price of the private firm is increased. One of two cases
arises: Competition in Cournot or [Firm 1 sets price, firm 0 sets quantity].
3.2 Results: Fixed Contract Motives with Solutions of Complements
By repeating the same process of preceding subsections, the explanation under the case of
complements is largely analogous to the one underlying the case of substitutes for four fixed
types of contracts. The setting when the goods are complements can now be briefly depicted10.
10The detailed computations of complements are available from author upon request. The Appendix C will not
be included in the main paper since the inference can be easily verified by reversing signs of c.
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The equilibrium social welfare levels and private firm’s profit are characterized by
SW cc = SW cb =
304 + 144c− 256c2 − 92c3 + 67c4 + 12c5 − 6c6
2(8− c2)2(2− c2)2 ; (36)
SW bb = SW bc =
304 + 144c− 816c2 − 316c3 + 787c4 + 222c5 − 320c6 − 50c7 + 45c8
8[(1− c2)(8− 5c2)]2 ; (37)
picc1 = pi
cb
1 =
(4 + 2c− c2)2
(8− c2)2(2− c2)2 , pi
bb
1 = pi
bc
1 =
(4 + 2c− 3c2 − c3)2
4(1− c2)(8− 5c2)2 , (38)
where each budget constraint is binding when all firms choose different types of contracts.
Compared to the case of substitutes, the Lagrange multipliers are always positive values in the
case of complements.
Before determining endogenous choices of strategic variables, we compare the public firm’s
price and total output under Bertrand competition with the private firm’s price and total out-
put under Cournot competition, respectively. Main findings comparing the each price and total
output between Cournot and Bertrand can be summarized in the following proposition (all cal-
culations are in the Appendix A).
Proposition 3: Suppose that goods are either substitutes or complements and each firm’s union
is allowed to engage in decentralized bargaining. Then, irrespective of the nature of goods,
XC < XB, pcc0 = p
cb
0 < p
cc
1 = p
cb
1 , p
cc
0 = p
cb
0 > p
bb
0 = p
bc
0 , and p
cc
1 = p
cb
1 > p
bb
1 = p
bc
1 ,
where XC = xcc1 + x
cc
0 = x
cb
1 + x
cb
0 and X
B = xbb1 + x
bb
0 = x
bc
1 + x
bc
0 .
Proposition 3 suggests that regardless of the nature of goods, the private firm’s price is always
higher than the public firm because of the imposition of a budget constraint, and that both firms’
prices are greater under Cournot than under Bertrand competition. Moreover, it shows that
the public and private firms’ total output under Bertrand competition are higher than under
Cournot competition. Proposition 3 is analogous to that in the standard setting the equilibrium
prices are higher under Cournot than under Bertrand competition, while introducing the public
firm into a unionized mixed duopoly indicates that the private firm’s price is always higher than
the public firm’s price.
4 Endogenous Choice of Contract with Substitutes and Com-
plements in a Mixed Duopoly
Once the equilibria for four fixed types of contract and social-welfare levels are derived as per
the preceding section, the type of contract can be determined endogenously by taking each
social-welfare level and each private firm’s profit as given. Therefore, we will consider the cases
of substitutes and complements at the same time.
For employing the three-stage game, let “C” and “B” represent, respectively, Cournot and
Bertrand competition with regard to each firm’s choice. In this section, the SPNE will be found
in the first stage for any given pair of competition types. Thus, the payoff matrix for the contract
game can be represented by the following table (Table 1).
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Table 1: Contract Game
Firm 0
Firm 1
C B
C picc1 , SW
cc pibc1 , SW
bc
B picb1 , SW
cb pibb1 , SW
bb
Since the comparison of each SWlm, lm = cc, cb, bb, bc in Table 1 becomes complicated, we
need to use numerical examples to illustrate the impact of either degree of substitutability or
complementary. Using this computation, the numerical analysis of Table 2 shows that the social
welfare is always greater under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition regardless
of which the goods are substitutes or complements11.
Table 2: Numerical Examples in Contract Game
Case of Substitutes Case of Complements
Value of c SW cc = SW cb SW bb = SW bc SW cc = SW cb SW bb = SW bc
0.01 0.590961548 0.5909708 0.596586892 0.596596394
0.05 0.580272253 0.580492137 0.60844028 0.608691546
0.15 0.556489786 0.558260535 0.642039279 0.644686716
...
...
...
...
0.51 0.496803576 0.51300658 0.836753368 0.907093362
0.52 0.495591709 0.512384336 0.844717028 0.920167739
...
...
...
...
0.89 0.463538455 0.508345527 1.387048603 3.074774601
0.90 0.463017987 0.508359617 1.413992966 3.353424932
...
...
...
...
0.98 0.459719889 0.503867899 1.680392056 15.58484322
0.99 0.459434736 0.502165707 1.721717336 30.86412902
Hence, choosing Betrand competition is best the public firm can do, regardless of the private
firm’s choice of contract and of whether the goods are substitutes or complements. We can there-
fore show that SW cc = SW cb < SW bb = SW bc under either substitutes or complements. As in
Table 1, for the public firm, choosing Cournot is strictly dominated by choosing Bertrand. So the
public firm never chooses a Cournot type of contract. Clearly, there can be sustained multiple
SPNEs in this stage since pibb1 = pi
bc
1 and pi
cc
1 = pi
cb
1 : (B, B) and (C, B). Multiple SPNEs of the
three-stage game in a unionized mixed duopoly are found and stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 4: Suppose that goods are either substitutes or complements and each firm’s union
is allowed to engage in decentralized bargaining. In that case, the public firm always chooses a
Bertrand type of contract and the private firm chooses either a Bertrand or a Cournot type of
contract regardless of whether the goods are substitutes or complements in the first stage.
By the restriction of one’s attention to the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the three-stage
game, one significant result can be derived from Proposition 4: only the public firm chooses a
type of contract that does not depends on the value of c in the equilibrium. The sustaining of
11For another straightforward calculations, all calculations are in the Appendix B.
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multiple SPNEs from pibb1 = pi
bc
1 and pi
cc
1 = pi
cb
1 plays an important role in the derivation of the
result.
Note that the case where the goods are substitutes; Even in a situation in which the
public firm chooses a Cournot (respectively, Bertrand) type of contract and the private firm
chooses a Bertrand (respectively, Bertrand) type of contract, wherein c ∈ [0.89, 1)(respectively,
c ∈ [0.90, 1)), the Bertrand competition entails higher social welfare than the Cournot compe-
tition. Moreover, this kind of a choice of strategic commitment by the public firm results in
the improvement of social welfare when all the firms choose different types of contracts. This
is because there exists a dominant strategy for the public firm to choose a Bertrand type of
contract, while there is no a dominant strategy for a private firm. Hence, Proposition 4 holds
irrespective of the nature of goods the ranking of social welfare is not reversed. As a result,
under a unionized mixed duopoly, social welfare under Bertrand competition will always be
determined by the public firm’s dominant strategy, wherein the Bertrand competition entails
higher social welfare than the Cournot competition.
In our framework of a mixed duopoly, there exists a dominant strategy only for the public firm
that chooses the Bertrand competition, regardless of the nature of goods; there is no dominant
strategy for a private firm. However, in the setting of Singh and Vives (1984), a dominant
strategy exists for both firms that choose the Cournot (or Bertrand) competition if the goods
are substitutes (or complements). Specifically, Lo´pez (2007) demonstrated that given the degree
of substitutability, each firm can have a dominant strategy depending on the parameter of
the bargaining power and the weight that the union attaches to the wage level. Nevertheless,
although we have assumed that the union possesses a full bargaining power (θ = 1) for the
wage level to present our results in a simple manner, it can be interpreted that unions place
considerable weight on the wage argument in their utility function, as depicted by Lo´pez (2007).
Thus, our findings partially assess the robustness of Lo´pez’s (2007) argument with respect to
the introduction of a unionized mixed duopoly. However, Lo´pez’s analysis (2007) suggests that
there can be a sustained unique Bertrand equilibrium12; on the contrary, in this paper, the
private firm’s profit is determined by the public firm’s choice of type of contract. Moreover,
there are multiple sustained SPNEs; this differs from the result of a unique equilibrium arrived
at by Singh and Vives (1984). On the other hand, Lo´pez (2007) demonstrated that when there
is no dominant strategy for the private firm, a Nash equilibria pair of Cournot and Bertrand
strategies can be sustained.
The results obtained in this paper are the same as those obtained by Singh and Vives’(1984)
and Lo´pez and Naylors’ (2004) conclusion in the sense that the Bertrand competition entails
higher social welfare than Cournot competition. However, the social welfare of a Cournot compe-
tition can be determined by each private firm’s dominant strategy. Moreover, Lo´pez and Naylor
(2004) demonstrated that when the goods are substitutes, profits obtained under a Bertrand
equilibrium are greater than those obtained in a Cournot equilibrium, if the unions are suffi-
ciently powerful and place considerable weight on the wage argument in their utility function;
this is a reverse of Singh and Vives’(1984) result. Their results hold without both making choice
of strategic variable and framework of mixed duopoly. By comparing the profits obtained under
12The general asymmetric Nash-bargaining over wages between between each union and its corresponding firm
solves: wi = arg maxu
β
i pi
1−β
i , where β ∈ (0, 1) is the union’s Nash bargaining parameter. Note that we use
full bargaining power (β = θ = 1) for the wage level and that w = 0. Thus, if we introduce the general case
(β = θ ∈ (0, 1)) into the privatization framework, the analysis will be very complicated when we compare the mixed
duopoly with privatization (i.e., a pure duopoly). Since all private firms have zero profits when β = θ = 1as in the
models described by Lo´pez and Naylor (2004, p. 685) and Lo´pez (2007, pp. 492-493), it is left for future research
to develop a comparison between privatization and a unionized mixed duopoly using the general asymmetric
Nash-bargaining over wages. As a start, under a unionized mixed duopoly, this paper analyzes an endogenous
type of contract in simple cases of union utility.
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the Cournot and Bertrand equilibrium in a unionized mixed duopoly, the following proposition
can be stated.
Proposition 5: Suppose that goods are either substitutes or complements and each firm’s union
is allowed to engage in decentralized bargaining. Then,
picc1 = pi
cb
1 > pi
bb
1 = pi
bc
1 if the goods are substitutes,
picc1 = pi
cb
1 > pi
bb = pibc1 if the goods are complements and c < cˆ ; 0.92.
Compared to the analysis in Lo´pez (2007), we show that except for the case of c ≥ cˆ ; 0.92,
Cournot equilibrium of private firm’s profit are greater than Bertrand equilibrium of private
firm’s profit as Singh and Vives’(1984) result.
The Proposition 3, 4 and 5 are in contrast to the propositions reported by Ghosh and Mitra
(2008); they compared Cournot and Bertrand competition in a mixed oligopoly without trade
unions and without an endogenous type of contract. Moreover, they primarily demonstrated
that despite the ambiguity in price ordering between Bertrand and Cournot competition for
private firms, a comparison of quantities and profits yields unambiguous results. In other words,
the public firm’s output is higher under a Cournot competition, whereas the private firm’s
output is lower under the same circumstances. In addition, the profits of both the firms are
lower under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition. It should be noted that
Ghosh and Mitra (2008) focused on the case of substitutes. The primary results of this study
show that the output and social welfare of public and private firms under Bertrand competition
are higher than under Cournot competition; this is because only the public firm is able to
choose a type of contract irrespective of the nature of the goods. Contrary to Ghosh and Mitra
(2008), we indicated that regardless of the nature of goods, the private firm’s price is always
higher than the public firm’s price and that the prices of both the firms are greater under the
Cournot competition than under the Bertrand competition. This is because of the imposition of
a budget constraint. Consequently, this paper differs from previous works (including the analysis
of Ghosh and Mitra (2008)) on unionized mixed oligopolies that focused on privatization without
the choice of strategic variables by both public and private firms. Thus, it was found that there
are multiple Nash equilibria in the contract stage of the game when there is a unionized mixed
duopoly and that the primary results obtained in this study differ from those obtained by Ghosh
and Mitra (2008), based on the exogenous type of contract.
In our setting, an endogenous type of contract is determined by the public firm, regardless
of the private firm’s strategic choice between price and quantity. Moreover, since the cost of
production is endogenously determined by introducing trade unions, it is necessary to include
the role of unions in order to derive Propositions 4 and 5 in the case of a mixed duopoly. Since
the public firm has an inherent tendency to expand output, its union becomes more aggressive
in wage bargaining than the private firm’s union does. However, due to imposition of a budget
constraint on the public firm, the profits of both public and private firms and the utilities of
the unions cancel each other on the social welfare function. Hence, the public firm’s objective
function is endogenously determined by the representative consumer’s utility. Consequently,
regardless of which firm’s profit and which union’s utility is larger, social welfare can always be
sustained under Bertrand competition equilibrium.
5 Concluding Remarks
We investigated a differentiated mixed duopoly in which private and public firms can choose to
strategically set prices or quantities by facing a union bargaining process. A choice of strategic
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variables was proposed endogenously in the first stage. For the case of a unionized mixed
duopoly, only the public firm is able to choose a type of contract irrespective of whether the
goods are substitutes or complements in the equilibrium. This effect leads the public firm to
use strategic commitment of Bertrand competition that can improve social welfare when all
firms choose different types of contracts. Moreover, there are multiple Nash equilibria in the
contract stage of the game. This result contrasts with the findings of Singh and Vives (1984),
Lo´pez (2007), and Lo´pez and Naylor (2004), in whose researches it is a dominant strategy for
each private firm in a pure duopoly to choose either a quantity or a price contract. Hence, our
main results hold irrespectively the nature of goods, except with sufficiently large parameter
of complements, the ranking of private firm’s profit is not reversed. This occurs because we
relinquish Singh and Vives’ assumption and deal with the type of contract as it exists in a
unionized mixed duopoly. Thus, our paper also suggests that private firm’s profit is determined
by public firm’s choice of contract.
We conclude by discussing the limitations of our paper. We have used the simplifying as-
sumption that private and public firms are symmetric due to identical production costs and a
decentralized unionization structure. By making these assumptions, we do not take into account
any cost difference that may arise from the mixed bargaining that occurs between private and
public firms. It is worth noting that the centralized (or, conversely, decentralized) wage-setting
process assumes that the centralized (or, conversely, decentralized) union sets a single (or, con-
versely, different) wage for all firms when public firms are less efficient than private firms. Thus,
this paper does not investigate whether or not the degree of the centralization of union bargain-
ing matters for private firms when they choose different bargaining regimes and use different
strategic variables. Moreover, we have not extended the model to consider a situation where the
public firm competes with both domestic and foreign private firms. An extension of our model
in these directions is for future research.
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Appendix A: List of Calculations of Proposition 3 and 5
List of calculations of complements
xcc0 = x
cb
0 =
2(4 + c− c2)
(2− c2)(8− c2) , x
cc
1 = x
cb
1 =
4 + 2c− c2
(2− c2)(8− c2) ;
pcc0 = p
cb
0 =
4 + c− c2
(8− c2) , p
cc
1 = p
cb
1 =
12 + 6c− 7c2 − 2c3 + c4
(2− c2)(8− c2) ;
xbb0 = x
bc
0 =
8 + 2c− 10c2 − c3 + 3c4
2(1− c2)(8− 5c2) , x
bb
1 = x
bc
1 =
4 + 2c− 3c2 − c3
2(1− c2)(8− 5c2) ;
pbb0 = p
bc
0 =
4 + c− 3c2
8− 5c2 , p
bb
1 = p
bc
1 =
12 + 6c− 9c2 − 3c3
2(8− 5c2) .
Comparison of each price: substitutes (respectively, complements)
pcb0 = p
cc
0 > p
bb
0 = p
bc
0 ⇔ 4c2 + 3c4 − c6 > 0 (respectively, pcb0 = pcc0 > pbb0 = pbc0 ⇔ 4c2 − 3c3 − c4 > 0),
pcb0 = p
cc
0 < p
cc
1 = p
cb
1 ⇔ 0 < 4− 4c− c2 + c3 (respectively, pcb0 = pcc0 < pcc1 = pcb1 ⇔ 0 < 4 + 4c− c2 − c3),
pcb1 = p
cc
1 > p
bb
1 = p
bc
1 ⇔ 42c2 − 16c3 − 26c4 + 16c5 − c6 − 3c7 > 0
(respectively, pcb1 = p
cc
1 > p
bb
1 = p
bc
1 ⇔ 42c2 + 16c3 − 26c4 − 16c5 + c6 − 3c7 > 0).
Comparison of total output: substitutes (respectively, complements)
xcb0 + x
cb
1 = x
cc
0 + x
cc
1 = X
C < XB = xbb0 + x
bb
1 = x
bc
0 + x
bc
1
⇔ −32c2 + 132c3 − 152c4 − 6c5 − 43c6 − 2c7 − 3c8 < 0
(respectively, − 32c2 + 88c3 − 72c4 − 54c5 + 43c6 + 2c7 − 3c8 < 0).
Comparison of each profit: substitutes (respectively, complements)
picb1 = pi
cc
1 > pi
bb
1 = pi
bc
1 ⇔
2048c2 − 2048c3 − 2560c4 + 3072c5 + 576c6 − 944c7 − 192c8 + 456c9 − 112c10 + 120c11 + 15c12 + 6c13 − c14 > 0
(respectively, picb1 = pi
cc
1 > pi
bb
1 = pi
bc
1 ⇔
2048c2 + 2048c3 − 2560c4 − 3072c5 + 576c6 + 944c7 − 192c8 − 456c9 − 112c10 − 120c11 + 15c12 − 6c13 − c14 > 0
if c < cˆ ; 0.92; otherwise, picb1 = picc1 < pibb1 = pibc1 ).
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Appendix B: Comparison of Social Welfare
Comparison of complements between SW cc = SW cb and SW bb = SW bc
SW cc(= SW cb)− SW bb(= SW bc) = −324576c2 − 32768c3 + 60416c4 + 92160c5 − 2890508c6 − 96128c7
+ 1632c8 + 44848c9 + 13560c10 − 8168c11 − 6614c12 − 44c13 + 1240c14 + 100c15 − 90c16 < 0.
Comparison of substitutes between SW cc = SW cb and SW bb = SW bc
SW cc(= SW cb)− SW bb(= SW bc) = −324576c2 + 32768c3 + 60416c4 − 92160c5 − 2890508c6 + 96128c7
+ 1632c8 − 44848c9 + 13560c10 + 8168c11 − 6614c12 + 44c13 + 1240c14 − 100c15 − 90c16 < 0.
Since comparing each SW lm; lm = cc, cb, bb, bc becomes complicated, so we need to use numerical
examples to illustrate the impact of the degree of c. Using this computation, the numerical
analysis of Table A-1 shows that regardless of the nature of goods, Bertrand competition entails
higher social welfare than the Cournot competition.
Table A-1: Numerical Examples in Contract Game
value of c Case of Complements Case of Substitutes
SW cc(= SW cb)− SW bb(= SW bc) SW cc(= SW cb)− SW bb(= SW bc)
0.01 −32.48975752 −32.42423995
0.02 −130.0827676 −129.5590692
0.03 −292.9540688 −291.1890716
...
...
...
0.51 −133105.4002 −129245.6055
0.52 −142442.4177 −138495.983
...
...
...
0.97 −2652325.594 −2652026.908
0.98 −2808479.518 −2808289.03
0.99 −2972575.467 −2972484.67
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It is available from author upon request
Appendix C: Case of Complements
For the reviewers and editor, this appendix will not be included in the main paper. However,
this is only available for the reviewers and editor: the case of complements. In this case where
we have been abbreviated, we present on separate page.
6 The Basic Model: Case of Complements
Consider two single-product firms producing differentiated products that are supplied by a public
firm 0 and a private firm 1. We assume that the representative consumer’s utility is a quadratic
function given by
U = xi + xj − 12
(
x2i + 2cxixj + x
2
i
)
,
where xi denotes the output of firm i = 0, 1. The parameter c ∈ (−1, 0) is a measure of the
degree of complementarity among goods. Thus, the inverse demand is characterized by
pi = 1 + cxj − xi; i 6= j, i = j = 0, 1, (39)
where pi is firm i’s market price and xi denotes the output of firm i = 0, 1. Hence, we can obtain
the direct demands as
xi =
(1 + c)− cpj − pi
1− c2 (40)
provided that quantities are positive.
To analyze the union’s wage bargaining, we also use same assumption as in the main body
of our paper. Taking w as given, the union’s optimal wage setting strategy wi regarding firm i
is defined as
ui = (wi − w)θxi; i = 0, 1, (41)
where θ is the weight that the union attaches to the wage level.
Therefore, the public firm 0’s objective function SW , and each firm’s profit pii are given by
SW = U −
1∑
i=0
pxi +
1∑
i=0
(pii + ui),
pii = (pi − wi)xi, i = 0, 1.
7 Bargaining in a Mixed Duopoly: Case of Complements
7.1 Results: Fixed Contract Motives with Solutions (Case of Complements)
A 3.1.1. [Competition Game in Cournot]: Assume that each firm i faces the inverse
demand functions given by pi = 1 + cxj −xi. In the third stage, the public firm’s objective is to
maximize welfare which is defined as the sum of consumer surplus, each firm’s profit, and each
union’s utility:
SW = U − p0x0 − p1x1 + pi1 + u1 + pi0 + u0 = U.
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Given w1 for the private firm, the public firm’s maximization problem is as follows:
max
x0
SW = U s.t. (p0 − w0)x0 ≥ 0.
The constraint implies that there is some lower-bound restriction on the public firm’s profit, i.e.,
the public firm faces a budget constraint. Therefore, since we assume that each firm’s output
is a positive value as in (40), we can rewritten the budget constraint as follows: (p0 − w0)x0 ≥
0⇔ 1 + cx1 − x0 − w0 ≥ 0.
Denoting the multiplier of the budget constraint λcc, the Lagrangian equation can be written
as
L = x1 + x0 − (x
2
1 + x
2
0 − 2cx0x1)
2
+ λcc(1− x0 + cx1 − w0).
Given wage level w0 in the third stage, the first-order conditions are given by
∂L
∂x0
= 1 + cx1 − x0 − λcc = 0 (42)
∂L
∂λcc
= 1 + cx1 − x0 − w0 = 0. (43)
On the other hand, the first-order condition for the private firm is given by
∂pi1
∂x1
= 0⇔ x1 = 12(1 + cx0 − w1). (44)
Solving the first-order conditions (43) and (44), we obtain,
x0 =
2 + c− 2w0 − cw1
2− c2 , (45)
x1 =
1 + c− w1 − cw0
2− c2 , (46)
λcc = 1 + cx1 − x0. (47)
To solve for Lagrangian equation, the budget constraint is momentarily binding. We check
ex-post that the omitted this constraint is binding.
In the second stage of this case, using (45) and (46), the problem for union i is defined as
max
w0
u0 = w0x0 =
w0(2 + c− 2w0 − cw1)
2− c2 ,
max
w1
u1 = w1x1 =
w1(1 + c− w1 − cw0)
2− c2 .
This implies the following first-order condition
w0 =
2 + c− cw1
4
, w1 =
1 + c− cw0
2
. (48)
Straightforward computation yields each an equilibrium wage, denoted as wcci is obtained by
solving (48), and substituting wcci into (45) and (46) yields the equilibrium output x
cc
i . Thus,
we have the following result.
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Lemma A-1: Suppose that goods are complements and each firm’s union is allowed to engage
in decentralized bargaining. Then, the equilibrium wage, output and price levels are given by
wcc0 =
4 + c− c2
8− c2 , w
cc
1 =
4 + 2c− c2
8− c2 ;
xcc0 =
2(4 + c− c2)
(2− c2)(8− c2) , x
cc
1 =
4 + 2c− c2
(2− c2)(8− c2) ;
pcc0 = w
cc
0 =
4 + c− c2
(8− c2) , p
cc
1 =
12 + 6c− 7c2 − 2c3 + c4
(2− c2)(8− c2) .
This Lemma A-1 suggests that the budget constraint is binding. That is, substituting Lemma
A-1 into (47) then we have
λcc =
8 + 2c− 6c2 − c3 + c4
(2− c2)(8− c2) > 0,
which shows that the public firm sets the output that yields zero profit in equilibrium.
Finally, noting that SW cc = U cc and picc1 , we can compute the social welfare and private
firm’s profit, SW cc and picc1 as follows;
SW cc =
304 + 144c− 256c2 − 92c3 + 67c4 + 12c5 − 6c6
2(8− c2)2(2− c2)2 , (49)
picc1 =
(4 + 2c− c2)2
(8− c2)2(2− c2)2 . (50)
A 3.1.2. [Competition Game in Bertrand]; Consider that firm i faces the following
direct demand function
xi =
(1 + c)− cpj − pi
1− c2 .
In the third stage, by maximization social welfare (respectively, profit) each firm sets its price
as a best response to any price chosen by its private firm (respectively, the public firm). The
public firm’s objective is given as in the previous case as follows:
max
p0
U =
(1 + c)− cp1 − p0
1− c2 +
(1 + c)− cp0 − p1
1− c2
− 1
2
{
[(1 + c)− cp1 − p0]2 + [(1 + c)− cp0 − p1]2 − 2c[(1 + c)− cp0 − p1][(1 + c)− cp1 − p0]
(1− c2)2
}
s.t. p0 − w0 ≥ 0.
Denoting the multiplier of the budget constraint λbb and repeating the same process as in
Competition Game in Cournot yields the first-order conditions of the Lagrangian equation with
respect to λbb and p0:13
∂L
∂p0
= 0⇔ λbb = cp1 + p0
1− c2 , (51)
∂L
∂λbb
= p0 − w0 = 0. (52)
13The calculations is as follows.
[(1 + c)− cp1 − p0]2 = (1 + c)2 − 2cp1 − 2p0 − 2c2p1 − 2cp0 + c2p21 + 2cp0p1 + p20
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On the other hand, the first-order condition for the private firm is given by
∂pi1
∂p1
= 0⇔ p1 = 1 + c− cp0 + w12 . (53)
By using xi and solving the these two equations (52) and (53) problems yields
x0 =
(1 + c)(2− c)− cw1 + (2− c2)w0
2(1− c2) , (54)
x1 =
1 + c− w1 − cw0
2(1− c2) . (55)
In the second stage of this case, using (54) and (55), the problems for union i are defined as
max
w0
u0 = w0x0 =
w0[(1 + c)(2− c)− cw1 + (2− c2)w0]
2(1− c2) , (56)
max
wi
u1 = w1x1 =
w1(1 + c− w1 − cw0)
2(1− c2) . (57)
The best reply functions for the public firm 0 and the private firm 1 are w0 =
(1+c)(2−c)−cw1
2(2−c2)
and w1 = 1+c−cw02 , respectively. Thus, straightforward computation yields each an equilibrium
wage, denoted as wbbi is obtained by maximizing (56) and (57), and substituting w
bb
i into (54)
and (55) yields the equilibrium output xbbi and price p
bb
i . Thus, we have the following result.
Lemma A-2: Suppose that goods are complements and each firm’s union is allowed to engage
in decentralized bargaining. Then, the equilibrium wage, output and price levels are given by
wbb0 =
4 + c− 3c2
8− 5c2 , w
bb
1 =
4 + 2c− 3c2 − c3
8− 5c2 ;
xbb0 =
8 + 2c− 10c2 − c3 + 3c4
2(1− c2)(8− 5c2) , x
bb
1 =
4 + 2c− 3c2 − c3
2(1− c2)(8− 5c2) ;
pbb0 =
4 + c− 3c2
8− 5c2 , p
bb
1 =
12 + 6c− 9c2 − 3c3
2(8− 5c2) .
[(1 + c)− cp0 − p1]2 = (1 + c)2 − 2cp0 − 2p1 − 2c2p0 − 2cp1 + c2p20 + 2cp0p1 + p21 and
[(1+c)−cp1−p0][(1+c)−cp0−p1] = (1+c)2−(1+c)cp0−(1+c)p1−(1+c)cp1+c2p1p0+cp21−(1+c)p0+cp20+p1p0.
Thus,
∂SW bb
∂p0
=
−2(1− c2)(1 + c)− {−2− 2c− 2c− 2c2 + 2cp1 + 2p0 + 2c2p0 + 2cp1 − 2c[−(1 + c)c− (1 + c) + c2p1 + 2cp0 + p1]}
2(1− c2)2
+ λbb = 0
⇔ ∂SW
bb
∂p0
=
−1− c+ c2 + c3 − {−1− c+ c2 + c3 + cp1 + p0 + c2p0 + cp1 − c[c2p1 + 2cp0 + p1]}
(1− c2)2 + λ
bb = 0
⇔ ∂SW
bb
∂p0
=
−{cp1 + p0 + c2p0 + cp1 − c3p1 − 2c2p0 − cp1}
(1− c)2 + λ
bb = 0
⇔ ∂SW
bb
∂p0
=
−{cp1 − c3p1 + p0 − c2p0}
(1− c2)2 + λ
bb = 0⇔ ∂SW
bb
∂p0
=
(1− c2){cp1 + p0}
(1− c2)2 = λ
bb
⇔ ∂SW
bb
∂p0
=
cp1 + p0
1− c2 = λ
bb when the goods are complements.
Thus,
∂SW bb
∂p0
=
−(cp1 − p0)
1− c2 = λ
bb when the goods are substitutes.
23
Substituting Lemma A-2 into (51) then we have
λbb =
8 + 14c− 9c3 − 3c4
2(8− 5c2)(1− c2) > 0,
which shows that the budget constraint is binding.
Finally, noting that SW bb = U bb and pibb1 , we can compute the social welfare and private
firm’s profit as SW bb and pibb1 respectively;
SW bb =
304 + 144c− 816c2 − 316c3 + 787c4 + 222c5 − 320c6 − 50c7 + 45c8
8[(1− c2)(8− 5c2)]2 , (58)
pibb1 =
(4 + 2c− 3c2 − c3)2
4(1− c2)(8− 5c2)2 . (59)
A 3.1.3. [Firm 0 sets price, firm 1 sets quantity]: Let firm 0 optimally choose its
price as a best response to any quantity chosen private firm 1, and let private firm 1 optimally
choose its quantity as a best response to any price chosen public firm 0. The demand function
that each firm i faces are given by
x0 = 1 + cx1 − p0 and p1 = 1 + c− cp0 − (1− c2)x1. (60)
In stage three, by maximization social welfare (respectively, profit) each firm sets its price as a
best response to any price chosen by its private firm (respectively, the public firm). The public
firm’s objective is given as in the previous case as follows:
max
p0
U = 1 + cx1 − p0 + x1 − 12[(1 + cx1 − p0)
2 + x21 − 2cx1(1 + cx1 − p0)] (61)
s.t. p0 − w0 ≥ 0.
Denoting the multiplier of the budget constraint λbc and repeating the same process as in
previous cases yields the first-order conditions of the Lagrangian equation with respect to p0
and λbc:
∂L
∂p0
= −p0 + λbc = 0, (62)
∂L
∂λbc
= p0 − w0 = 0. (63)
On the other hand, the private firm’s objective function as follows:
max
x1
pi1 = [1 + c− cp0 − (1− c2)x1 − w1]x1.
Thus, the first-order condition for the private firm is given by
∂pi1
∂x1
= 0⇔ x1 = 1 + c− cp0 − w12(1− c2) .
Thus, we obtain the pair (x1, p0) written as
x1 =
1 + c− cp0 − w1
2(1− c2) , (64)
p0 = w0. (65)
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Substituting the pair (x1, p0) into the pair (x0, p1) yields
x0 =
(1 + c)(2− c)− cw1 − (2− c2)w0
2(1− c2) , (66)
p1 =
1 + c− cw0 − w1
2
. (67)
Then, optimal wages are set to maximize union’s firm including the public union’s utility:
u = xiui. The best reply functions for the private firm 1 and the public firm 0 are as follows.
w1 =
1 + c− cw0
2
and w0 =
(1 + c)(2− c)− cw1
2(2− c2) .
Straightforward computation yields the same results as in Lemma A-2 since best reply functions
are the same, i.e., (54) equals to (66) and (53) equals to (67). Thus, wbci = w
bb
i , x
bc
i = x
bb
i
and pbci = p
bb
i . Therefore, we obtain the same social welfare and the private firm’s profit, i.e.,
SW bc = SW bb and pibc1 = pi
bb
1 . Substituting equilibrium values into (62) yields
λbc = pbc0 =
4 + c− 3c2
8− 5c2 > 0. (68)
Thus, we have the following result.
Proposition A-1: Suppose that goods are complements and each firm’s union is allowed to
bargain collectively. Then, both the equilibrium private firm’s profit and social welfare in the
case of [Firm 0 sets price, firm 1 sets quantity] are equal to those in the case of [Competition
Game in Bertrand].
This Proposition A-1 suggests that regardless of the choice of the private firm’s strategic variable
between the price and quantity, the public firm can commit to choose the competition game in
Bertrand. Thus, the type of contract of the private firm is determined by public firm’s choosing
the type of contract.
A 3.1.4. [Firm 1 sets price, firm 0 sets quantity]: Let firm 1 optimally choose its
price as a best response to any quantity chosen private firm 0, and let private firm 0 optimally
choose its quantity as a best response to any price chosen public firm 1. The demand function
that each firm i faces is given by
x1 = 1 + cx0 − p1 and p0 = 1 + c− cp1 − (1− c2)x0. (69)
Thus, the public firm’s objective is given as in the previous case as follows:
max
x0
U = 1 + cx0 − p1 + x0 − [(1 + cx0 − p1)
2 + x20 − 2cx0(1 + cx0 − p1)]
2
s.t. 1 + c− cp1 − (1− c2)x0 − w0 ≥ 0.
Denoting the multiplier of the budget constraint λcb, the Lagrangian equation can be written as
L = 1 + cx0 − p1 + x0 − [(1 + cx0 − p1)
2 + x20 − 2cx0(1 + cx0 − p1)]
2
+ λcb[1 + c− cp1 − (1− c2)x0 − w0].
Taking wi as given, the first-order conditions are given by
∂L
∂x0
= 1 + c− x0 + c2x0 − λcb(1− c2) = 0, (70)
∂L
∂λcb
= 1 + c− cp1 − (1− c2)x0 − w0 = 0. (71)
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In the second stage of this case, from profit and social welfare optimization for each firm, we
obtain the pair (p1, x0) as
p1 =
1 + w1 + cx0
2
and x0 =
1 + c− cp1 − w0
1− c2 . (72)
Substituting (p1, x0) into (71) yields
p1 =
1 + c+ w1 − c2w1 − cw0
2− c2 and x0 =
2 + c− 2w0 − cw1
2− c2 . (73)
In addition, substituting p1 into x1 yields
x1 =
1 + c− cw0 − w1
2− c2 . (74)
Then, optimal wages are set to maximize union’s firm including the public union’s utility:
u = xiui. This implies the following equilibrium wages:
wcb0 =
4 + c− c2
8− c2 , w
cb
1 =
4 + 2c− c2
8− c2 .
Thus,
pcb0 =
4 + c− c2
(8− c2) , p
cb
1 =
12 + 6c− 7c2 − 2c3 + c4
(2− c2)(8− c2) .
Similar to the case of 3.1.3. [Firm 0 sets price, firm 1 sets quantity], straightforward compu-
tation yields the same results as in Lemma A-1 since best reply functions in Lemma A-1 equal
to (43) and (44). Thus, wcci = w
cb
i and x
cc
i = x
cb
i . Therefore, we obtain the same social welfare
and the private firm’s profit, i.e., SW cc = SW cb and picc1 = pi
cb
1 . Substituting equilibrium values
into (70) then we have
λcb =
1− x0(1− c)
(1− c) =
8 + 6c− 6c2 − 2c3 + c4
(1− c)(2− c2)(8− c2) > 0,
which shows that budget constraint is binding. Thus, we have the following result.
Proposition A-2: Suppose that goods are complements and each firm’s union is allowed to
bargain collectively. Then, both the equilibrium private firm’s profit and social welfare in the
case of [Firm 1 sets price, firm 0 sets quantity] are equal to those in the case of [Competition
Game in Cournot].
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